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Abstract—We investigate a routing game that allows for the creation of coalitions, within the framework of cooperative game theory.
Specifically, we describe the cost of each coalition as its maximin value. This represents the performance that the coalition can
guarantee itself, under any (including worst) conditions. We then investigate fundamental solution concepts of the considered
cooperative game, namely the core and a variant of the min-max fair nucleolus.
We consider two types of routing games based on the agents’ Performance Objectives, namely bottleneck routing games and additive
routing games. For bottleneck games we establish that the core includes all system-optimal flow profiles and that the nucleolus is
system-optimal or disadvantageous for the smallest agent in the system. Moreover, we describe an interesting set of scenarios for
which the nucleolus is always system-optimal. For additive games, we focus on the fundamental load balancing game of routing over
parallel links. We establish that, in contrary to bottleneck games, not all system-optimal flow profiles lie in the core. However, we
describe a specific system-optimal flow profile that does lie in the core and, under assumptions of symmetry, is equal to the nucleolus.
Index Terms—Atomic Splittable Routing Games, Non-Transferable Utility Coalitional Games, Cooperative Game Theory, Worst-Case
Analysis, Bottleneck Objectives, Additive Objectives, Core, Nucleolus.
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1 INTRODUCTION
To date, game theoretic models have been employed in
virtually all networking contexts. These include control
tasks at the network layer, such as flow control and routing
(e.g., [1]–[4]). In particular, research until now in routing
games has mainly focused on non-cooperative networking
games, where the selfish decision makers (i.e., the users or
agents) cannot communicate and reach a binding agreement
on the way they would share the network infrastructure.
Moreover, the main dynamics that were considered were
Best-Response, i.e., each agent would observe the present
state of the network and react to it in a self-optimizing
manner. ly, the operating points of such systems were taken
to be some equilibria of the underlying non-cooperative
game, most notably Nash equilibria. Such equilibria are
inherently inefficient and, in general, exhibit suboptimal
network performance. As a result, the question of how bad
the quality of a non-cooperative equilibrium is with respect
to a centrally enforced optimum has received considerable
attention e.g., [4], [5].
However, there is a growing number of networking
scenarios where, while there is competition among self-
optimizing agents, there is also a possibility for these agents
to communicate, negotiate and reach a binding agreement
(see, e.g., [6]–[14]). Indeed, in many scenarios, the com-
petition is among business organizations, which can, and
often do, reach agreements (e.g., SLAs) on the way that
they provide, consume or share the network resources. The
proper framework for analyzing such settings is that of
Cooperative Game Theory [14], [15]. Such a paradigm trans-
fer, from non-cooperative to cooperative games, calls to
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revisit fundamental concepts. Indeed, the operating point
of the network is not an equilibrium of a non-cooperative
game anymore, but rather a solution of a cooperative
game. Accordingly, the performance degradation of such
systems should be considered at new operating points. In
the realm of routing games, such an operating point has
been proposed in [16], which considered the adoption of the
Nash Bargaining Scheme (NBS) [17] as a way of reducing
the potentially high inefficiency of the Nash Equilibrium.1
Nevertheless, the NBS only contemplates two scenarios,
namely the “grand coalition” (i.e., an agreement reached by
all agents) and the disagreement point, i.e., the outcome of
the fully non-cooperative scenario. Thus, while bargaining
between entities is encouraged at the NBS, it might be
advantageous for groups to deviate from the agreed strategy
and form subcoalitions. Such deviations are to be avoided,
since it returns the network to its inefficient non-cooperative
scenario. Accordingly, we focus on routing strategies for
which deviations of subcoalitions do not occur when agents
behave in a rational manner. A design guideline would be
to have a mediator, e.g., a network administrator, propose
to all agents in the network only to route their flow ac-
cording to such stable operating points. More importantly,
this gives a credible guarantee to all agents that the agreed
upon solution will be implemented. To represent the set of
stable operating points, we focus on the core [15] of our
game. Since the core might include several solutions, we
further consider a specific solution in the core with min-
max fairness properties, which is a variant of the nucleolus
[18].
When considering a coalitional game with N agents,
1The NBS has been considered in other networking scenarios, e.g.,
[6]. However, to the best of our knowledge, [16] is the first to consider
the NBS in the context of routing games.
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2a major question is what cost should be attributed to
each of the 2N possible coalitions. In other words, which
scenario can each coalition expect in the network when
deviating from the agreed upon solution? In the traditional
game theoretic setting all agents try to minimize their cost
function, however in the context of networking, it is often
plausible to contemplate scenarios in which some agents do
not care about optimizing their own cost, but seem to act
maliciously towards others [19]–[24]. Such behavior is due
to a range of reasons, e.g., hackers or rivaling companies
that aim to degrade network quality. Moreover and perhaps
more notably, it may happen that some agents are not
aware of how to optimize their cost, hence they might
exhibit seemingly “irrational”, thus unexpected, behavior.
In light of such settings, we model the cost of a coalition
to equal its worst-case scenario, in order to investigate what
amount of resources it can guarantee under any (including
worst) conditions. Specifically, we describe the cost of each
coalition as its maximin value [25], i.e., as the corresponding
best-response to the maximin strategy of the agents outside
the coalition.23 This represents the cost that a coalition can
guarantee itself, even under the pessimistic expectation that
the agents outside the coalition have unpredictable or even
malicious objectives. More importantly, this way of model-
ing gives an a priori insight into any agreement proposed by
a mediator. Clearly, no agreement can be reached between
all agents if a subset of agents can guarantee itself a better
outcome at its worst-case scenario.
We concretize our study of coalitions in routing games
by considering two types of games based on the structure of
the agents’ performance objectives. The first game considers
agents with bottleneck objectives, i.e., their performance is de-
termined by the worst component (link) in the network [26]–
[29]. Bottleneck routing games have been shown to emerge in
many practical scenarios. For example, in wireless networks,
the weakest link in a transmission is determined by the
node with the least remaining battery power. Hence, each
agent would route traffic so as to maximize the smallest
battery lifetime along its routing topology. Additionally,
bottleneck routing games arise in congested networks where
it is desirable to move traffic away from congested hot spots.
For further discussion and additional examples see [26]. The
second type of game considers agents with additive perfor-
mance measures, where the performance is determined by
the sum of its link performances, e.g., delay or packet loss.
Much of the current literature on networking games has
focused on such games, e.g., [1]–[5], [30]–[34], albeit in the
traditional setting of non-cooperative agents.
2When dealing with payoffs instead of costs, this corresponds to
the minimax value of a coalition [25]. Alternatively, this scenario can
be viewed as a Stackelberg game [15], where an adversary, which acts
as “leader”, tries to maximize the cost of the coalition, which acts as
“follower”. Recently, in [24] the maximin value of two-player games
has been studied in the restricted setting of users with M/M/1 cost
functions.
3In our considered game, the maximin strategy of the agents
outside the coalition does not necessarily equal the minimax strategy
of the coalition.
Our Contribution
We focus our study on the atomic splittable routing model
[1], [26], in which each agent sends its non-negligible de-
mand to the destination by splitting it over a set of paths
in the network. Moreover, agents are able to cooperate
and form coalitions. In particular, we formulate a Non-
Transferable Utility Coalitional Game [15] and describe the
cost of each coalition as its maximin value. For bottleneck
routing games we establish that coalitions with larger ag-
gregated demand receive a smaller cost at their maximin
flow profile. Through this result, we describe a set of flow
profiles that are stable4, i.e., from which it is not worthwhile
for any coalition to deviate. In particular, to represent the
set of stable solutions, we focus on the core and a variant of
the min-max fair nucleolus. For bottleneck games we establish
that any system-optimal flow profile lies in the core. More-
over, at the nucleolus we establish that (1) all agents route
their flow according to the system optimum or (2) only the
smallest agent experiences performance that is worse than at
the system optimum. Next, we describe an interesting set of
scenarios in which the nucleolus is always system-optimal.
Specifically, and counter-intuitively, we establish that in a
network where the two smallest agents are of equal size, the
nucleolus is always system-optimal. A special case of this
scenario is when all agents have equal demands.
For additive routing games we focus on the framework
of routing in a “parallel links” network. Beyond being a
basic framework of routing, this is the generic framework
of load balancing among servers in a network. It has been
the subject of numerous studies in the context of non-
cooperative networking games, e.g., [1], [3], [5], [30], [32],
[34], to name a few. Quite surprisingly, we establish that
at the maximin strategy, the “malicious” agents outside the
coalition act as if they were a continuum of infinitesimal (i.e.,
nonatomic) self-optimizing agents. With the above structural
result at hand, we establish that, in contrast to bottleneck
games, not all system-optimal flow profiles are necessarily
stable. Nevertheless, we prove that a particular system-
optimal flow profile does lie in the core, namely where all
agents send their demand proportionally with respect to
the system optimum. Finally, we show that when agents
have equal demands, this proportional system-optimal flow
profile is also equal to the nucleolus.
2 MODEL AND GAME THEORETIC FORMULATIONS
2.1 Model
We consider a set N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of selfish “users” (or,
“players”, “agents”), which share a communication network
modeled by a directed graph G(V,E), as illustrated in
Figure 1. We denote by P the set of all paths in the network.
Each user i ∈ N has a traffic demand ri and all users share
a common source S and common destination D. Denote the
aggregated demand of users in the coalition S ⊆ N as rS ,
4Formally, the core [15] considers a set of stable cost allocations,
each of which, in our routing game, refers to a set of flow profiles.
While abiding by the mathematical definition of the core, in the context
of this paper, we will also refer to the corresponding routing strategy
flow profiles as being stable.
3Fig. 1. Communication Network
and the demand of all the users as R, i.e., R =
∑
i∈N r
i. A
user ships its demand from S to D by splitting it along the
paths in P , i.e., user i decides what fraction of ri should be
sent on each path. We denote by f ip, the flow that user i ∈ N
sends on path p ∈ P . User i can fix any value for f ip, as long
as f ip ≥ 0 (non-negativity constraint) and
∑
p∈P f
i
p = r
i
(demand constraint); this assignment of traffic to paths,
f i = {f ip}p∈P shall also be referred to as the routing strategy
of user i. The (routing strategy) flow profile f is the vector of
all user routing strategies, f = (f1, f2, . . . , fN). We say that
a user’s routing strategy is feasible if its components obey
the nonnegativity and demand constraints. We say that a
flow profile f is feasible if it is composed of feasible routing
strategies and we denote by Fi the convex and compact set
of all feasible f i’s. Also denote the set F as the set of all
feasible flow profiles. Turning our attention to a path p ∈ P ,
let fp be the total flow on that path i.e., fp =
∑
i∈N f
i
p;
also denote by f ie the flow that i sends on link e ∈ E, i.e.,
f ie =
∑
p|e∈p f
i
p. Similarly, the total flow on link e ∈ E is
denoted by fe =
∑
i∈N f
i
e. For any coalition of users S ⊆ N
the aggregated flow on path p and link e is denoted by
respectively fSp =
∑
i∈S f
i
p and f
S
e =
∑
i∈S f
i
e.
Occasionally, we focus on the framework of routing in a
“parallel links” network. In such cases G(V,E) corresponds
to a graph with parallel “links” (e.g., communication links,
servers, etc.) L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, L > 1, and a user ships
its demand by splitting it over the links L, see Figure 2.
As observed in [35], it constitutes an appropriate model
for seemingly unrelated networking problems. For exam-
ple, in a QoS-supporting network architecture, bandwidth
may be separated among different virtual paths, resulting
effectively in a system of parallel and noninterfering links
between the source and destination. Additionally, one can
consider a corporation or organization that receives service
from a number of different network providers. The corpora-
tion can split its total flow over the various network facilities
(according to performance and cost considerations), each of
which can be represented as a link in the parallel link model.
More generally, the problem of routing over parallel links is,
essentially, the generic problem of load balancing among
several servers, and it has been the subject of numerous
studies, including the seminal paper [5] and many others,
e.g., [1], [3], [30], [32], [34].
In G(V,E), we associate with each link a performance
function Te(·), which corresponds to the cost per unit of
flow through link e and only depends on the total flow
fe. Furthermore, we impose the following assumptions on
Te(fe):
Fig. 2. Parallel links network
S1 Te(fe) is continuous and strictly increasing in fe.
S2 Te : [0,∞)→ [0,∞].
S3 For every flow profile f , if not all costs are finite then
at least one user with infinite cost can change its own
strategy to make its cost finite.
Cost functions that comply with the above assumptions
shall be referred to as standard. The performance measure of
a user i ∈ N is given by a cost function J i(f). In bottleneck
routing games, J i(f) corresponds to the performance of
the worst-case link, and in additive routing games it cor-
responds to the sum of all link performances in the system.
An N -tuple of positive values J = (J1, J2, . . . , JN ) is said
to be a feasible cost vector if there is a feasible routing strategy
flow profile f ∈ F such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , J i = J i(f).
Denote the set of feasible cost vectors by J .
2.2 Bottleneck routing cost function
Following [26], we represent the cost of a user i ∈ N as the
worst performance of any link in the network that i sends a
positive amount of flow on. Thus, the cost of user i equals
J i(f) , max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe). (1)
We measure the welfare of the system through the
cost of the worst performing link in the network, i.e.,
through a (“social”) cost function Jsys defined as Jsys ,
maxe∈E|fe>0 Te(fe). For bottleneck routing games we con-
sider users with standard cost functions.
2.3 Additive routing cost function
Another important class of problems is when users are
interested additive performance measures, e.g., delay or
packet loss. In this case, Te may correspond to the total
delay of link e. Following [1], [35], [36] and many others,
we consider users whose cost functions are of the following
form:
J i(f) ,
∑
p∈P
f ip
∑
e∈p
Te(fe). (2)
Moreover, we consider Te(fe) to be convex and continu-
ously differentiable. As commonly assumed in the literature
(e.g., [3], [4], [30], [32], [33], [35], [36]), for additive routing
games the system’s cost is equal to the sum of the individual
costs of the players, i.e., Jsys =
∑
i∈N J
i. The system’s cost
thus equals:
Jsys =
∑
i∈N
∑
p∈P
∑
e∈p
f ipTe(fe) =
∑
e∈E
feTe(fe). (3)
42.4 System Optimization
We denote the optimal value of the system’s cost as J∗sys,
i.e., the minimal value of Jsys over all feasible routing
strategy flow profiles. Any flow profile that corresponds to
the system optimum, we denote by f∗ = (f∗p )p∈P . For both
bottleneck and additive routing games, Jsys depends only
on the total flows on the links. Accordingly, f∗ is an optimal
vector of link flows, i.e., J∗sys = maxe∈E|f∗e>0 Te(f
∗
e ) and
J∗sys =
∑
e∈E f
∗
e Te(f
∗
e ) for respectively bottleneck and
additive routing games. A recurring flow profile in this
study is the proportional flow profile where all users send their
flow proportionally with regard to the system optimum: for
any system-optimal flow profile f∗, any user i and path p,
f ip =
ri
R f
∗
p . We denote the cost vector at the proportional
flow profile as the Proportional Cost Allocation (PCA). Con-
sequently, at the PCA, for each user i ∈ N with bottleneck
costs, J i(f∗) = J∗sys, and for users with additive costs,
J i(f∗) =
∑
p∈P
ri
R
f∗p
∑
e∈p
Te(f
∗
e ) =
ri
R
J∗sys, ∀i ∈ N . (4)
2.5 Nonatomic users
In this study we focus on a finite set of (nonzero-size) users
that can split their flow among the links. Nevertheless,
some of the following results state that at times a user
may behave as if it were a continuum of infinitesimal self-
optimizing users, referred to as a set of nonatomic users. A
nonatomic user places its demand on a single path pˆ, for
which
∑
e∈pˆ Te(fe) = minp∈P
∑
e∈p Te(fe) [37]. If a finite
user i behaves as if it were a set of self-optimizing nonatomic
users, it follows that, ∀pˆ, p ∈ P :
if f ipˆ > 0→
∑
e∈pˆ
Te(fe) ≤
∑
e∈p
Te(fe). (5)
We will refer to (5) as the best-response behavior of a set of
nonatomic users.
2.6 Coalitional game
We proceed to formalize our coalitional game, by attribut-
ing a set of costs to every coalition S ⊆ N . Note that
our cost functions represent a variety of costs, e.g., delay,
which are not considered to be a commodity that users can
freely transfer between themselves, hence we define a Non-
Transferable Utility (NTU) Game [15], as follows.
Definition 2.1. A NTU coalitional game consists of a mapping
V (·) that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a set of outcomes
V (S) ⊆ R|S|, which is non-empty, closed and convex.5
A coalition behaves as a single user controlling the flow of
its participants and V (S) represents the set of feasible cost
allocations that S can achieve for itself.
5In [15] additional conditions are cited, which trivially follow for
our considered game.
3 BOTTLENECK ROUTING GAMES
3.1 Maximin flow profile
As explained in the introduction, our goal is to propose
stable and fair routing strategies to all N users. However,
once a coalition of users S decides to deviate from our
proposed solution, we model it to incur a worst-case cost.
Specifically, we represent the cost of every coalition that
deviates (and there are 2|N | − 1 such possible coalitions),
as its maximin value in the game between S and the users
in N\S. The maximin value of S corresponds to the lowest
cost S can guarantee against the worst (for S) strategy of
the users outside the coalition. In other words, all users in
N\S aim to maximize JS by sending their flow according to
fN\S. Given fN\S, S behaves as a single user controlling the
flow of its participants and aims to minimize their combined
cost JS . Clearly, by cooperating, the users in N\S can only
increase their damage to S. Therefore, when considering the
maximin value of S, we represent all users in N\S as a
single malicious user that aims to maximize the cost of S.
For each coalition we can now view this as a game between
two players, S and N\S. Given any routing strategy fN\S
denote the best-response strategy of coalition S as
fˆS(fN\S) = arg min
fS∈FS
{JS(fN\S, fS)}. (6)
The maximin strategy of the users in N\S is equal to
fˆN\S = arg max
fN\S∈FN\S
{ min
fS∈FS
JS(fN\S, fS)} (7)
and given fˆN\S, the coalition S send its demand according
to its best-response strategy, i.e.,
fˆS(fˆN\S) = arg min
fS∈FS
{JS(fˆN\S, fS)}. (8)
We refer to (fˆN\S, fˆS(fˆN\S)) as the maximin (routing strat-
egy) flow profile.6 To simplify the notation, we will frequently
refer to fˆS(fˆN\S) as fˆS. From the point of view of the
coalition, at the maximin flow profile, the users outside of
the coalition act in a malicious manner. Since a coalition S
behaves as a single user controlling the flow of its partici-
pants, it follows from (1) that in a bottleneck routing game,
JS(fN\S, fS) = max
{e∈E|fSe >0}
Te(f
N\S
e + f
S
e ), (9)
where fSe represents the combined flow of all users i ∈ S on
link e, i.e., fSe =
∑
i∈S f
i
e. In order to describe the behavior
6In [38] it has been established that, for bottleneck routing games,
JS(fN\S, fS) is not necessarily continuous in FS. Thus, at the max-
imin flow profile we will consider the set of flow profiles (fˆN\S, fˆS)
such that
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS(fˆN\S)) ≥ sup
fN\S∈FN\S
JS(fN\S, fˆS(fN\S))− δ,
and given any fN\S
JS(fN\S, fˆS) ≤ inf
fS∈FS
JS(fN\S, fS) + 
for some small enough , δ ≥ 0. Consequently, due to the compactness
of FS and FN\S, it is clear that a maximin profile always exists,
however it is not necessarily unique. For additive routing games,
JS(fN\S, fS) is a continuous function, thus , δ = 0.
5of a coalition at the maximin flow profile, we first establish
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a bottleneck routing game. For any two
coalitions S, T ⊆ N with rT ≥ rS :
JT (fˆN\T, fˆT) ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS).
Proof. We establish the lemma by constructing a routing
strategy f¯N\S, such that
JT (fˆN\T, fˆT) ≤ JS(f¯N\S, fˆS(f¯N\S)). (10)
Then, as a result of (10) and (7), the lemma follows. For
every path p, consider f¯N\Sp , gN\Sp +hN\Sp , where gN\Sp =
fˆ
N\T
p . Since
∑
p∈P fˆ
N\T
p = rN\T ≤ rN\S , we construct
h
N\S
p by sending the remaining demand (i.e., rN\S − rN\T )
on the paths where fˆTp > 0, while abiding by the constraint
h
N\S
p < fˆTp . This constraint is feasible since
∑
p∈P h
N\S
p =
rN\S − rN\T = rT − rS < rT . Denote the best-response
strategy fˆS(f¯N\S) as f¯S and assume by contradiction that
JT (fˆN\T, fˆT) > JS(f¯N\S, f¯S). (11)
From (11) it follows that
max
e∈E|fˆTe >0
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + fˆ
T
e ) > max
e∈E|f¯Se >0
Te(f¯
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ) (12)
= max
e|f¯Se >0
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ).
We now define a new routing strategy fT where for any
path p, fTp = h
N\S
p + f¯Sp . This strategy is feasible since
rT =
∑
p∈P f
T
p =
∑
p∈P h
N\S
p + f¯Sp = r
T − rS + rS . Thus,
for any link e, fTe = h
N\S
e +f¯Se . Since fˆ
T is the best-response
strategy to fˆN\T, we get that
max
{e∈E|hN\Se +f¯Se >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ) ≥ (13)
max
{e∈E|fˆTe >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + fˆ
T
e ).
As a result of (12) and (13) it follows that
max
{e∈E|hN\Se +f¯Se >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ) > (14)
max
{e∈E|f¯Se >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ).
Therefore,
max
{e∈E|hN\Se +f¯Se >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ) = (15)
max
{e∈E|hN\Se >0,f¯Se =0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e ).
By definition, for any link e where hN\Se > 0 it holds that
fˆTe > 0. Thus, from (14) and (15) it follows that
max
{e∈E|fˆTe >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e ) ≥ (16)
max
{e∈E|hN\Se >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e ) =
max
{e∈E|hN\Se >0,f¯Se =0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e ) =
max
{e∈E|hN\Se +f¯Se >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e + f¯
S
e ).
Finally, from (16) and (13) we get that
max
{e∈E|fˆTe >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + h
N\S
e ) ≥
max
{e∈E|fˆTe >0}
Te(fˆ
N\T
e + fˆ
T
e ),
which is a contradiction since hN\Se < fˆTe for all e ∈ E.
Thus, (10) follows and the lemma is established.
According to Lemma 3.1, coalitions with a larger de-
mand receive a smaller cost at their maximin flow profile.
In other words, the threat of the users outside the coalition
decreases when the coalition’s demand increases.
3.2 Worst-Case coalitions
We now proceed to describe our coalitional game as defined
in Definition 2.1. In particular, for each coalition S, denote
by (fˆN\S, fˆS) a maximin routing strategy flow profile of the
game between S and N\S, i.e., the flow profile in which
N\S acts according to (7) and S acts according to (8). Also
denote J(fˆN\S, fˆS) ∈ J as the cost vector of all users, when
sending their demand according to (fˆN\S, fˆS). Further-
more, denote by JS(fˆN\S, fˆS) the projection of J(fˆN\S, fˆS)
onto RS , i.e., the cost vector of the users in the coalition S.
Note that JS(fˆN\S, fˆS) is not equal to JS(fˆN\S, fˆS), as the
former is a cost function and the latter a vector of user costs.
We now define our mapping of V (S).
Definition 3.1. For every coalition S ⊆ N :
V (S) , {JS(fˆN\S, fˆS)}.
Thus, given a coalition of users S, V (S) is a set of all
possible cost vectors in whichN\S sends its flow according
to (7) and S sends its flow according to (8). It is clear
that V (S) satisfies the conditions of an NTU coalitional
game. Closedness follows directly from Assumption S2 and
following [15], [16], it can be shown that V (S) is convex.
Having defined the worst-case coalitional game, we proceed
to investigate it through the study of several (fair and stable)
solution concepts of cooperative game theory.
3.3 The core
We consider the game as defined in Definition 3.1 and
continue to describe its core, i.e., a set of solutions that are
stable against coalitional deviations [15].
Definition 3.2. Given an NTU coalitional game V (·), the core
of the game is a set of cost vectors Jc ⊆ J such that ∀J ∈ Jc,
∀S ⊆ N and for any J¯ ∈ J :
• J ∈ V (N).
• If J¯ i < J i, ∀i ∈ S, then J¯S /∈ V (S).
Translated to our scenario, a feasible cost vector lies in
the core if there does not exist any coalition S, such that
all users in S strictly decrease their cost when sending their
demand according to any maximin flow profile (fˆN\S, fˆS).
We continue with the following theorem.
6Theorem 3.1. Consider a bottleneck routing game. Any system-
optimal flow profile corresponds to a cost vector that lies in the
core.
Proof. According to Lemma 3.1, for any two coalitions
S, T ⊆ N with rT ≥ rS it follows that JT (fˆN\T, fˆT) ≤
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS). In particular, for the grand coalition N and
any coalition S ⊆ N it follows that
J∗sys = J
N (fˆN ) ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS).
Consequently, for any coalition S ⊆ N ,
J∗sys ≤ { max{e∈E|∑k∈S fˆke>0}Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )} (17)
= max
k∈S
{ max
e∈E|fˆke>0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )}.
Consider a system-optimal flow profile f∗ and denote the
flow of user i on link e as f∗ie . From (17) it follows that for
any i ∈ N and any S ⊆ N ,
max
e∈E|f∗ie >0
Te(f
∗
e ) ≤ max
e∈E|f∗e>0
Te(f
∗
e ) (18)
≤ max
k∈S
{ max
e∈E|fˆke>0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )}.
Hence, there exists some coalition S and user j ∈ S for
which
Jj(f∗) = max
e∈E|f∗je >0
Te(f
∗
e ) ≤ max
e∈E|fˆje>0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )
= Jj(fˆN\S, fˆS).
In other words, for any coalition S ⊆ N , any maximin
flow profile (fˆN\S, fˆS) and any system-optimal flow profile
f∗, there always exists some user j ∈ S which receives a
higher (or equal) cost at (fˆN\S, fˆS) compared to f∗. Thus,
any system-optimal flow profile f∗ corresponds to a cost
vector that lies in the core.
In the proof of Theorem 3.1 we established that for any
coalition S ⊆ N , there exists a user that prefers the system-
optimal flow profile over any maximin flow profile. We will
show that the same result holds with respect to the system-
optimal flow profile and any Nash equilibrium.
Suppose we consider a different coalitional game than
the one described in Definition 3.1, in which a deviating
coalition S does not incur a maximin cost. Specifically, in
this new game the users in the coalition S work together
as a single large user, while the users outside the coalition
do not aim to maximize the cost of S. Instead, they do not
cooperate and their goal is to minimize their own costs. De-
note the set of users outside the coalition as {1, 2, . . . , NS},
where NS = |N\S|. Thus, for each deviating coalition
S ⊆ N , we consider a non-cooperative game between the
users {S, 1, . . . , NS}, where each user i aims to minimize its
own cost. The next theorem is proven in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2. Consider users with bottleneck objectives and
consider an NTU coalitional game, where for any S ⊆ N , V (S)
is equal to the set of Nash equilibria between S and all individual
users in N\S. Any system-optimal flow profile corresponds to a
cost vector that lies in the core.
For the remainder of the paper we only consider the worst-
case NTU coalitional game as defined in Definition 3.1.
3.4 The Routing Game Nucleolus
Theorem 3.1 establishes that in a bottleneck routing game,
no coalition of users wishes to deviate from any flow profile
which is optimal from a system’s perspective. Yet, out of
all the stable flow profiles in the core, which one should
be proposed to the users in the network? We proceed to
consider a further refinement of the core with additional
fairness guarantees. In particular, we focus on a routing
strategy flow profile which preserves stability while adding
min-max fairness properties to the users. For that, we con-
sider a variant of the well studied Nucleolus [18]. Although
the nucleolus is originally defined for Transferable-Utility
games, we shall adapt its definition to fit our model. Due to
this change, certain attributes such as its uniqueness are not
guaranteed, unless proven. Moreover, we will need to prove
that the nucleolus lies in the core of the game. Consider a
feasible cost vector J(f) ∈ J . We define the excess of each
coalition S ⊂ N at J(f) as
eS(J(f)) , JS(f)− JS(fˆN\S, fˆS), (19)
where JS(f) corresponds to the coalition’s cost at flow
profile f . For bottleneck routing games, JS(f) corresponds
to (9), thus the excess of a coalition S is equal to
eS(J(f)) , max
e∈E|fSe >0
Te(fe)− max
e∈E|fˆSe >0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )
(20)
= max
i∈S
{ max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe)} −max
i∈S
{ max
e∈E|fˆie>0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )}.
For ease of notation we shall refer to eS(J(f)) as eS(J).
The excess can be interpreted as the “dissatisfaction” of a
coalition S at a cost vector J(f). The smaller the excess, the
more a coalition S is satisfied. Note that even though the
maximin flow profile is not necessarily unique, due to (7),
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS) is equal for all maximin flow profiles. Denote
the excess vector e(J) = [eS(J)]S⊂N , and denote e∗(J)
as a permutation of the entries of e(J) arranged in non-
increasing order.
Definition 3.3. We define the Routing Game Nucleolus (RGN)
as: {J ∈ J | @J¯ ∈ J , e∗(J¯) ≺lxm e∗(J)}, where ≺lxm means
that it is smaller in the lexicographical sense.
Hence, the RGN is the cost vector that minimizes the
excess of the coalitions in the lexicographic ordering, i.e., it
treats the welfare of coalitions in a min-max fair manner.
We denote the vector of user costs at the Routing Game
Nucleolus as JRGN.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a bottleneck routing game. The Rout-
ing Game Nucleolus lies in the core.
Proof. From Lemma 3.1 it follows that for any coalition S ⊂
N , J∗sys ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS). Therefore, due to (19), the excess
of any coalition S ⊆ N at J∗ , [J∗sys]i∈N is equal to
eS(J
∗) = J∗sys − JS(fˆN\S, fˆS) ≤ 0. (21)
Consequently, from Definition 3.3 it follows that for any
coalition S ⊂ N , eS(JRGN) ≤ maxS⊆N eS(J∗) ≤ 0. Denote
7the flow profile at the RGN as f . It follows from (20) that for
any coalition S ⊂ N ,
max
i∈S
{ max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe)} ≤ max
i∈S
{ max
e∈E|fˆie>0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )}.
(22)
As a result of (22), for any coalition S there exists some user
k ∈ S for which
Jk(fˆN\S, fˆS) = max
i∈S
{ max
e∈E|fˆie>0
Te(fˆ
N\S
e + fˆ
S
e )}
≥ max
i∈S
{ max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe)} ≥ JkRGN .
In other words, for any coalition S there exists some user
k ∈ S that receives a lower cost at the nucleolus compared
to any maximin flow profile. Thus, the nucleolus lies in the
core.
We now continue to describe the RGN. Before doing so,
we bring the following definition from [39].
Definition 3.4. A flow profile f is referred to as balanced if
for any two paths p1, p2 ∈ P with fp1 > 0, it holds that
maxe∈p1 Te(fe) ≤ maxe∈p2 Te(fe).
In other words, at a balanced flow profile, every possible
path with positive flow has the same cost for its worst-case
link. In [39], the next lemma is proven.
Lemma 3.2. [Lemma 1 in [39]] Consider a bottleneck routing
game. Any system-optimal flow profile is balanced.
For the following theorem denote the user with the
smallest demand as j, i.e., rj = mink∈N rk.
Theorem 3.3. Consider a bottleneck routing game.
(1): JRGN = [J∗sys]i∈N , and/or
(2): JjRGN > J
∗
sys, and for all k ∈ N\j, JkRGN ≤ J∗sys.
Proof. Consider the coalition K , N\j and the cost vector
J∗ , [J∗sys]i∈N . According to Lemma 3.1, for any coalition
S ⊂ N ,
JK(fˆN\K, fˆK) ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS) and eK(J∗) ≥ eS(J∗).
(23)
Denote the flow profile at the RGN as f . Due to (23) and
Definition 3.3 it follows that eK(JRGN) ≤ eK(J∗). Hence,
max
i∈K
{
max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe)
}
≤ max
e∈E|f∗e>0
Te(f
∗
e ). (24)
Assume by contradiction that there exists some user k ∈ K
for which JkRGN > J
∗
sys. Thus,
max
e∈E|fke>0
Te(fe) > max
e∈E|f∗e>0
Te(f
∗
e ),
which is a contradiction to (24). Hence, there does not exist
any k 6= j for which JkRGN > J∗sys.
Now suppose that JjRGN < J
∗
sys and for all k 6= j,
JkRGN ≤ J∗sys. According to Lemma 3.2, any system-optimal
flow profile is balanced. Thus, every path with positive flow
has the same cost for its worst-case link. It follows that,
max
e∈E|f∗ie >0
Te(f
∗
e ) = max
e∈E|f∗e>0
Te(f
∗
e ), ∀i ∈ N (25)
i.e., for any i ∈ N , J i(f∗) = J∗sys. As a result, there does not
exist a system-optimal flow profile f∗ for which Jj(f∗) <
J∗sys. Consequently, there must exist some user k 6= j for
which JkRGN > J
∗
sys, which is a contradiction. Therefore, at
the Routing Game Nucleolus, either (1): J iRGN = J
∗
sys for
all i ∈ N , and/or (2): JjRGN > J∗sys and JkRGN ≤ J∗sys for
all k ∈ N\j.
Theorem 3.3 establishes that at the nucleolus of a bot-
tleneck routing game, there are two possible scenarios. (1):
All users send their flow according to the system optimum
and/or (2): Only the user with the smallest demand sends
its flow on the worst-case link in the system, while the other
users receive a similar or better performance than at the
system optimum.
This result is quite counterintuitive, and combined with
Lemma 3.2, Theorem 3.3 illustrates that the smallest user in
the system is never better off at the nucleolus than at any
system-optimal flow profile. In the following example, we
illustrate two different networks, where each corresponds
to one of the settings of Theorem 3.3.
Fig. 3. Nucleolus of a bottleneck routing game
Example 3.1. Consider the network in Figure 3, where for each
link e ∈ E\{n}, Te(fe) = fe. Moreover, consider two users,
r1 = 2 and r2 = 20. At the system-optimal flow profile, both
users split their flow equally among the paths {S,A,D} and
{S,B,D}. We first describe the maximin flow profile of user
2. User 1 maximizes the cost of user 2 by placing all of its
flow on the path {S,A,B,D}. As a best-response, user 2 places
2/3 on link n and splits the rest of its flow equally among
the paths {S,A,D} and {S,B,D}. Thus, J2(fˆ1, fˆ2) = 11 23
and e2(J∗(f∗)) = J∗sys − J2(fˆ1, fˆ2) = 11 − 11 23 = − 23 .
We now consider the excess of user 1. If user 2 places an
amount of 5 on link n and sends the rest on path {S,A,B,D},
then the best-response strategy of users 1 is to split its en-
tire demand on the paths {S,A,D} and {S,B,D}. Thus,
e1(J
∗(f∗)) = J∗sys − J1(fˆ2, fˆ1) ≤ 11 − 16 = −5. However,
if we propose a different flow profile, f , where user 1 places
an amount of 1 on link n and splits the rest of its demand
together with user 2 on the paths {S,A,D} and {S,B,D}, we
get that e2(J(f)) = 10.5 − 11 23 = −1 16 ≤ e2(J∗(f∗)) and
e1(J(f)) ≤ 12 − 16 = −4. Therefore, J∗ , [J∗sys]i∈N is not
equal to the RGN.
Now consider a network as illustrated in Figure 3, however
without link n. It is straightforward that J∗ is equal to the RGN.
8We continue to focus on a special case in which there
exist at least two “smallest” users in the system, i.e., there
exist users j1, j2 such that rj1 = rj2 = mink∈N rk.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a bottleneck routing game where there
exist users j1, j2 such that rj1 = rj2 = mink∈N rk. The Routing
Game Nucleolus is equal to [J∗sys]i∈N .
Proof. Denote the grand coalition without user j1 as K1 ,
N\j1 and the grand coalition without user j2 asK2 , N\j2.
Clearly, rK1 = rK2 ≥ rS for any coalition S ⊂ N . As a
result of Lemma 3.1 for any S ⊂ N ,
JK1(fˆN\K1 , fˆK1) = JK2(fˆN\K2 , fˆK2) ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS).
Therefore, the excess of K1 and K2 at J∗ , [J∗sys]i∈N is
equal to
eK1(J
∗) = eK2(J
∗) = max
e∈E|f∗e>0
Te(f
∗
e )− JK1(fˆN\K1 , fˆK1)
≥ eS(J∗), ∀S ⊂ N . (26)
Moreover, from Definition 3.3 and (26), it follows that
eK1(JRGN) ≤ eK1(J∗) and eK2(JRGN) ≤ eK2(J∗). (27)
Denote the flow profile at the RGN as f and assume by
contradiction that there exists a user k for which JkRGN >
J∗sys. Since user k lies in K1 or K2 (or both) it holds that:
max
i∈K1
{
max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe)
}
> J∗sys
and/or max
i∈K2
{
max
e∈E|fie>0
Te(fe)
}
> J∗sys.
Therefore, eK1(JRGN) > eK1(J
∗) and/or eK2(JRGN) >
eK2(J
∗), which is a contradiction to (27).
Now assume by contradiction that there exists a user
k for which JkRGN < J
∗
sys. According to Lemma 3.2, any
system-optimal flow profile f∗ is balanced. Thus, there does
not exist a system-optimal flow profile f∗ and a user k for
which Jk(f∗) < J∗sys. It follows that at the RGN there must
exist another user i for which J iRGN > J
∗
sys, which is a
contradiction.
The conditions of Theorem 3.4 describe a range of sce-
narios for which the nucleolus is always equal to the system-
optimal flow profile. For example, in a network where users
have a finite number of different demands, e.g., “large”,
“medium” and “small”, the conditions of Theorem 3.4 are
satisfied for a network with at least two “small” users. Of
course Theorem 3.4 also holds in a network where all users
have equal demands, i.e., for all i, j ∈ N , ri = rj . We denote
such users as symmetrical.
Corollary 3.1. Consider a bottleneck routing game with symmet-
rical users. The Routing Game Nucleolus is equal to [J∗sys]i∈N .
Through Theorem 3.1 we established that a flow profile
which is optimal from a system’s perspective is also stable
against coalitional deviations. Moreover, Proposition 3.1 and
Theorem 3.3 establish that the min-max fair nucleolus is (i)
stable and (ii) system-optimal or disadvantageous for the
smallest user in the system. Finally, Theorem 3.4 describes
an interesting set of scenarios where the RGN is a desirable
solution, from a fairness perspective, from a social perspec-
tive, and easy to implement due to its stability.
4 ADDITIVE ROUTING GAMES
4.1 Maximin respresentation
In contrast to bottleneck routing games, we now focus on
users that are interested in additive performance measures,
such as delay or packet loss. Moreover, we focus on the
parallel links model as described in Section 2. Thus, from [1],
f∗ is a unique vector of link flows and the system-optimal
proportional flow profile (4) is unique in the individual link
flows. Moreover, since a coalition S behaves as a single user
controlling the flow of its participants, it follows from (2)
that
JS(f) =
∑
i∈S
J i(f) =
∑
l∈L
fSl Tl(fl). (28)
Consequently, as stated in (7), the maximin strategy of the
users in M , N\S is equal to
fˆM = arg max
fM∈FM
{ min
fS∈FS
∑
l∈L
fSl Tl(f
M
l + f
S
l )} (29)
and given fˆM, the coalition S send its demand according to
fˆS(fˆM) = arg min
fS∈FS
∑
l∈L
fSl Tl(fˆ
M
l + f
S
l ). (30)
The (malicious) user M aims to send its demand according
to (29) and sends an amount of flow fˆMl on each link l ∈ L,
such that, when S responds according to (30), its cost is
maximized. To describe the behavior of M at the maximin
flow profile, we first establish several lemmas. In each
lemma we start out with a flow profile f = (fM, fˆS(fM)),
where fˆS(fM) denotes the best-response routing strategy
of S given fM, i.e., given fM the coalition S sends its
demand according to (6). We then change the strategy of the
malicious user to gM, whereafter the coalition S responds
with a new best-response strategy gˆS(gM). Finally, we draw
conclusions on the cost of S at (gM, gˆS(gM)). Denote the
best-response strategy of S to fM and gM as, respectively
fˆS, and gˆS. Consider the flow profile f = (fM, fˆS) and order
the links such that T1(fM1 + fˆ
S
1 ) ≤ . . . ≤ TL(fML + fˆSL ). We
define the set of the links with the lowest cost per unit of
flow at f as
L] , {l ∈ L | Tl(fMl + fˆSl ) = min
n∈L
Tn(f
M
n + fˆ
S
n )}.
The first lemma establishes that when M decreases the
amount of flow it sends on the links with the lowest cost, it
also lowers the cost of S.
Lemma 4.1. Consider a flow profile f = (fM, fˆS), the set of
links L] and link q /∈ L]. Moreover, consider a new routing
strategy gM and an amount of flow ∆ ,
∑
l∈L] ∆l > 0 such
that for any link l ∈ L] gMl = fMl −∆l, gMq = fMq + ∆ and
∀l ∈ L\{L] ∪ q}, gMl = fMl . Then
JS(gM, gˆS) < JS(fM, fˆS). (31)
Proof. In order to establish the lemma, we construct an
alternative routing strategy for S, g¯S. By definition, the cost
of S when applying gˆS will be less or equal to its cost at
9g¯S, i.e., JS(gM, gˆS) ≤ JS(gM, g¯S). Thus, it is sufficient to
construct a feasible routing strategy g¯S, which satisfies
JS(gM, g¯S) < JS(fM, fˆS). (32)
We consider two cases:
1) ∆ >
∑
l/∈L] fˆ
S
l
2) ∆ ≤∑l/∈L] fˆSl .
Consider Case 1. We construct g¯S by sending all of rS ran-
domly on the links l ∈ L], while abiding by the constraint
that g¯Sl ≤ ∆l+ fˆSl for all l ∈ L]. According to the conditions
of Case 1, ∆ > rS −∑l∈L] fˆSl . Thus,
rS =
∑
l∈L]
g¯Sl <
∑
l∈L]
[∆l + fˆ
S
l ].
Consequently, there exists some link r for which g¯Sr < ∆r +
fˆSr . Therefore, it follows that
JS(gM, g¯S) =
∑
l∈L]
g¯Sl Tl(f
M
l −∆l + g¯Sl ) (33)
<
∑
l∈L]
g¯Sl Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l )
≤
∑
l∈L
fˆSl Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l ) = J
S(fM, fˆS),
where the last inequality of (33) is due to the fact that ∀l ∈
L],∀n /∈ L], Tl(fMl + fˆSl ) < Tn(fMn + fˆSn ). For Case 2, we
consider two subcases.
2a. ∆ ≤ fˆSq .
2b. ∆ > fˆSq .
Consider Subcase 2a. We start at fˆS and construct g¯S by
sending ∆ from link q to all the links l ∈ L] such that
g¯Sl = ∆l + fˆ
S
l . It follows that for all l ∈ L], Tl(gMl + g¯Sl ) =
Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l ) and Tq(g
M
q + g¯
S
q ) = Tq(f
M
q + fˆ
S
q ). Therefore,
JS(gM, g¯S) =
∑
l∈L]
(fˆSl + ∆l)Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l )
+ (fˆSq −∆)Tq(fMq + fˆSq )
+
∑
l∈L\{L]∪q}
fˆSl Tl
(
fMl + fˆ
S
l
)
<
∑
l∈L
fˆSl Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l ) = J
S(fM, fˆS),
since ∀l ∈ L], Tl(fMl + fˆSl ) < Tq(fMq + fˆSq ).
Now consider Subcase 2b. We start at fˆS and construct
g¯S by sending an amount of flow fˆSq from link q to the links
in L] and randomly consider a different link q′ /∈ L]. If
∆− fˆSq ≤ fˆSq′ we finish constructing g¯S by sending ∆− fˆSq
from link q′ to the links in L]. Otherwise we send fˆSq′ from
link q′ to the links in L] and again consider a different link
q′′ /∈ L]. Through this process, we construct g¯S by sending
a total amount of flow equal to ∆ from a set of links with
a higher cost per unit of flow than the links in L]. Since L
is finite and ∆ ≤ ∑l/∈L] fˆSl , we will reach a link n /∈ L] for
which ∆−∑k∈F fˆSk ≤ fˆSn , where F denotes the set of links
we considered before reaching link n. We finish to construct
g¯S by sending a total flow of ∆ from the links {F ∪ n} to
the links in L]. Observe that for any l ∈ L],
Tl(g
M
l + g¯
S
l ) = Tl
(
(fMl −∆l) + (fˆSl + ∆l)
)
(34)
= Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l ) < Tr(f
M
r + fˆ
S
r ), ∀r /∈ L].
Consequently, from (34),
JS(gM, g¯S) =
∑
l∈L]
(fˆSl + ∆l)Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l ) + g¯
S
nTn(f
M
n + g¯
S
n )
+
∑
l∈L\{L]∪n∪F}
fˆSl Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l )
<
∑
l∈L
fˆSl Tl(f
M
l + fˆ
S
l ) = J
S(fM, fˆS).
Hence, given gM, we constructed a routing strategy g¯S that
satisfies (32).
We continue to establish that when M increases the
amount of flow it sends on the links with the lowest cost, it
raises the cost of S.
Lemma 4.2. Consider a flow profile f = (fM, fˆS), the set of
links L] and link q /∈ L]. Moreover, consider a new routing
strategy gM and an amount of flow ∆ ,
∑
l∈L] ∆l > 0 such
that for any link l ∈ L] gMl = fMl + ∆l, gMq = fMq − ∆,
∀l ∈ L\{L] ∪ q}, gMl = fMl , and{
l ∈ L|Tl(gMl + gˆSl ) = min
n∈L
Tn(g
M
n + gˆ
S
n )
}
= L]. (35)
Then
JS(gM, gˆS) > JS(fM, fˆS).
Proof. The constraint in (35) implies that the set of links with
minimal cost per unit of flow are equal in both (fM, fˆS) and
(gM, gˆS).
Assume by contradiction that JS(gM, gˆS) ≤
JS(fM, fˆS). Consider a new routing strategy hM where
for all l ∈ L] hMl = gMl − ∆l, hMq = gMq + ∆ and
∀l\{L] ∪ q}, hMl = gMl . Due to (35) and Lemma 4.1,
it follows that JS(hM, hˆS) < JS(fM, fˆS). However,
hM = fM, which is a contradiction.
Through Lemma 4.2, we have proven that it is in the
malicious user’s interest to send more flow on the links with
the lowest cost per unit of flow. We are now able to establish
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Consider an additive routing game and a coalition
S ⊆ N . At the maximin flow profile N\S sends its flow
according to (5), i.e., N\S sends its flow according to the best-
response behavior of a set of non-atomic users with an aggregated
demand of rN\S .
Proof. Consider a maximin flow profile (fˆN\S, fˆS) and de-
note the set
Lˆ ,
{
l ∈ L|Tl(fˆN\Sl + fˆSl ) = minn∈L Tn(fˆ
N\S
n + fˆ
S
n ).
}
Assume by contradiction that there exists a link q /∈ Lˆ,
for which fˆN\Sq > 0. We construct a feasible routing strategy
gN\S at which the malicious user moves a small amount of
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flow ∆ from link q to the links in Lˆ, such that 0 < ∆ < fˆN\Sq
and
{l ∈ L|Tl(fˆN\Sl +∆l+fˆSl ) = minn∈L Tn(fˆ
N\S
n +∆n+fˆ
S
n )} = Lˆ
,i.e., such that the set of links in Lˆ does not change. Accord-
ing to Lemma 4.2, this increases the cost of S. Thus, fˆN\S
does not maximize (7), which is a contradiction. Hence, at its
optimal routing strategy, N\S will send its flow according
to (5).
According to Theorem 4.1, for any coalition S ⊆ N
at its maximin strategy, the users in N\S act as if they
were a set of self-optimizing non-atomic users. Moreover, S
represents a single finite user and sends its flow according
to its best-response strategy (30). This specific scenario has
been investigated in [34], [40] among others. In [40] it has
been established that, for additive routing games, the setting
of self-optimizing non-atomic users together with a single
finite user S, admits a unique equilibrium. Therefore, as a
result of Theorem 4.1, we conclude that the maximin profile
is unique for any coalition. Further, in [34] the following
lemma is established.
Lemma 4.3. [Theorem 5.2 in [34]] Consider an additive routing
game. For any two coalitions S, T ⊆ N with rT ≥ rS :
1
rT
JT (fˆN\T, fˆT) ≤ 1
rS
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS). (36)
In other words, Lemma 4.3 implies that the average
cost of a deviating coalition decreases when its aggregated
demand increases. Note that this result is similar to Lemma
3.1 for bottleneck routing games, although in Lemma 4.3 the
costs are averaged.
4.2 The core
We continue to describe the core of our coalitional game
with additive costs. In the following proposition we es-
tablish that in general, not every system-optimal allocation
lies in the core. This is in contrast to Theorem 3.1, which
considers bottleneck routing games.
Proposition 4.1. Consider an additive routing game and suppose
there exists a coalition S and a maximin flow profile (fˆN\S, fˆS),
which is not system-optimal. There exists a system-optimal flow
profile whose corresponding cost vector does not lie in the core.
Proof. Our goal is to construct a system-optimal flow profile
f¯ such that for some coalition S ⊆ N with maximin flow
profile (fˆN\S, fˆS) it holds that,
J i(f¯) > J i(fˆN\S, fˆS), ∀i ∈ S. (37)
Consider a coalition S ⊆ N and a maximin flow profile
(fˆN\S, fˆS) 6= f∗ as described in the proposition. Also
consider the two complementary sets: L+ = {l ∈ L|fˆN\Sl ≥
f∗l } and L− = {l ∈ L|fˆN\Sl < f∗l }. We construct a new
routing strategy for S, f¯S in which it “fills” up the links
in L− according to the system optimum, starting from link
L upwards. Since
∑
l∈L+ f
∗
l − fˆN\Sl ≤ 0, it follows that∑
l∈L− f
∗
l − fˆN\Sl ≥ rS . Therefore, after the filling process,
S reaches a link, K ∈ L− for which f¯SK ≤ f∗K − fˆN\SK and
for any link l > K, l ∈ L−, f¯Sl = f∗l − fˆN\Sl . At the new
flow profile, S’s cost is equal to
JS(fˆN\S, f¯S) =
∑
l>K
l∈L−
[f∗l − fˆN\Sl ]Tl(f∗l )
+ f¯SKTK(f¯
S
K + fˆ
N\S
K )
> JS(fˆN\S, fˆS), (38)
because fˆS is the best-response strategy to fˆN\S and from
[1] it follows that the best-response strategy is unique. We
now change the routing strategy of N\S and construct a
flow profile f¯ , (f¯N\S, f¯S) that is system-optimal and for
which JS(f¯N\S, f¯S) ≥ JS(fˆN\S, f¯S). By doing so we have
constructed a feasible system-optimal flow profile for which
JS(f¯N\S, f¯S) > JS(fˆN\S, fˆS).
We define the strategy f¯N\S as follows. On any link l ∈
L, N\S sends an amount f¯N\Sl such that f¯N\Sl + f¯Sl = f∗l .
Since for any link l, f¯Sl ≤ f∗l , this new routing strategy is
feasible. Thus, on any link l ∈ L−, l > K, user N\S does
not increase its flow, i.e., f¯N\Sl = fˆ
N\S
l . Furthermore, on
link K , f¯N\SK ≥ fˆN\SK . As a result,
JS(f¯N\S, f¯S) (39)
=
∑
l>K
l∈L−
[
f∗l − f¯N\Sl
]
Tl(f
∗
l ) + f¯
S
KTK(f¯
S
K + f¯
N\S
K )
≥
∑
l>K
l∈L−
[
f∗l − fˆN\Sl
]
Tl(f
∗
l ) + f¯
S
KTK(f¯
S
K + fˆ
N\S
K ).
Hence, from (38) and (39), JS(f¯N\S, f¯S) ≥ JS(fˆN\S, f¯S) >
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS). Now that we have constructed a system-
optimal flow profile f¯ , we can decide on how to split its
cost among the individual users. Specifically, consider the
system-optimal cost vector where all users in S send their
flow proportionally to f¯Sl . Thus, for every user i ∈ S,
f¯ il =
ri
rS f¯
S
l and the cost of every user i ∈ S is equal
to J¯ i = r
i
rS J
S(f¯N\S, f¯S). Furthermore, denote by Jˆ i the
cost of user i ∈ S when sending its flow proportionally
to (fˆN\S, fˆS), i.e., Jˆ i = r
i
rS J
S(fˆN\S, fˆS). Clearly, it is in
every users interest to deviate from the proposed system-
optimal cost vector and send their flow proportionally to
the maximin flow profile, i.e., for all i ∈ S, J¯ i > Jˆ i, which
satisfies (37). It follows from Definition 3.2 that the system-
optimal profile f¯ , at which users in S proportionally split
their flow, does not lie in the core.
According to Proposition 4.1, for additive routing games,
in general not every system-optimal cost allocation lies
in the core. Nevertheless, we focus on a particular cost
allocation that does always lie in the core.
Theorem 4.2. Consider an additive routing game. The Propor-
tional Cost Allocation lies in the core.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the system-optimal
Proportional Cost Allocation (4), does not lie in the core.
Hence, there exists a coalition S for which it is worthwhile
to deviate from the proportional flow profile and incur its
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cost at the maximin flow profile (fˆN\S, fˆS), as defined in
Definition 3.1. Therefore, it follows that for all users i ∈ S
ri
R
J∗sys > J
i(fˆN\S, fˆS). (40)
However, it follows from Lemma 4.3 that ∀S ⊆ N :
1
R
JN (fˆN ) =
1
R
J∗sys ≤
1
rS
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS),
which turns into
rS
R
J∗sys ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS), ∀S ⊆ N . (41)
Since, r
S
R J
∗
sys =
∑
i∈S
ri
R J
∗
sys and J
S(fˆN\S, fˆS) =∑
i∈S J
i(fˆN\S, fˆS), inequality (41) implies that if any coali-
tion S ⊆ N deviates from the PCA, there must exist
some user i ∈ S, for which riR J∗sys ≤ J i(fˆN\S, fˆS). This
is a contradiction to (40). Therefore, the Proportional Cost
Allocation lies in the core.
Theorem 4.2 illustrates that the proportional flow profile
is not only system-optimal, but also stable against coali-
tional deviations. Moreover, as a result of Proposition 4.1,
in an additive routing game stability is a specific property
of only certain system-optimal flow profiles, in particular
the proportional flow profile.
Note that Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.1 consider users
with standard cost functions. In Appendix B we provide an
example of a network where the users’ cost functions are not
standard. In that example, users have different performance
objectives, and the proportional flow profile does not lie in
the core. This illustrates that Theorem 4.2 heavily depends
on the setting of the system. Nevertheless, Theorem 4.2
states that, for users with standard additive performance
objectives, if all users send their demand according to the
proportional routing strategy, then (i) the system is optimal
and (ii) none of the 2N − 1 possible coalitions would benefit
by deviating from this strategy. Thus, for such users the
proportional flow profile is easy to implement and highly
desirable from a “social” perspective.
4.3 The Routing Game Nucleolus
We now continue to describe the RGN of our additive
routing game. Due to the cost function in (28), for additive
routing games we define a slightly different excess for each
coalition, which is normalized in the coalition’s demand.
Specifically, for each coalition S ⊂ N and a cost vector J(f),
eS(J(f)) ,
1
rS
[
JS(f)− JS(fˆN\S, fˆS)
]
. (42)
Hence, we consider the “average dissatisfaction” of a coali-
tion S at a cost vector J(f). Similarly to bottleneck routing
games, we first prove that the RGN lies in the core.
Proposition 4.2. Consider an additive routing game. The Rout-
ing Game Nucleolus lies in the core.
Proof. Denote the Proportional Cost Allocation as J∗. From
Lemma 4.3 it follows that for any coalition S ⊂ N ,
rS
R J
∗
sys ≤ JS(fˆN\S, fˆS). Therefore, due to (42), the excess
of any coalition S ⊆ N at J∗ equals
eS(J
∗) =
1
R
J∗sys −
1
rS
JS(fˆN\S, fˆS) ≤ 0. (43)
Consequently, from Definition 3.3 it follows that for any
coalition S ⊂ N , eS(JRGN) ≤ maxS⊆N eS(J∗) ≤ 0. Denote
the flow profile at the RGN as f . It follows from (42) that for
any coalition S ⊂ N ,
1
rS
∑
i∈S
∑
l∈L
f il Tl(fl) ≤
1
rS
∑
i∈S
∑
l∈L
fˆ il Tl(fˆ
N\S
l + fˆ
S
l ).
Hence, for any coalition S there exist a user k ∈ S for which
JkRGN =
∑
l∈L
fkl Tl(fl) ≤
∑
l∈L
fˆkl Tl(fˆ
N\S
l + fˆ
S
l )
= Jk(fˆN\S, fˆS).
Consequently, the nucleolus lies in the core.
We now continue to describe the nucleolus for symmet-
rical users.
Theorem 4.3. Consider an additive routing game with symmet-
rical users. The Routing Game Nucleolus is equal to the system-
optimal Proportional Cost Allocation7.
Proof. Consider an additive routing game and denote the
Proportional Cost Allocation as J∗. Since all users have
equal demands, for any two coalitions S, T ⊆ N with
|T | > |S| it follows that rT > rS . Moreover, according
to Lemma 4.3, 1rT Jˆ
T (fˆN\T, fˆT) ≤ 1rS JˆS(fˆN\S, fˆS) and
eT (J
∗) ≥ eS(J∗). Similarly, if |T | = |S| it follows that
eT (J
∗) = eS(J∗). This implies that, at the PCA, any coali-
tion of size |S| = N − 1 has the largest excess. Altogether,
there exist
( N
N−1
)
= N different combinations of coalitions
for which |S| = N − 1 and their excesses are equal.
Now assume by contradiction that there exists some cost
vector J¯(f¯) ∈ J for which e∗(J¯) ≺lxm e∗(J∗). Consider a
coalition K for which |K| = N − 1. From Definition 3.3 it
follows that eS(J¯) ≤ maxS⊆N eS(J∗) = eK(J∗). Therefore,
it follows from (42) that for any coalition K with size |S| =
N − 1:
1
rK
[
J¯K − JˆK(fˆN\K, fˆK)
]
≤ 1
R
J∗sys −
1
rK
JˆK(fˆN\K, fˆK).
Hence, for any coalition K with size |K| = N − 1:
∑
i∈K
J¯ i ≤ r
K
R
J∗sys. (44)
As a result of (44), we get that
∑
K⊂N
|K|=N−1
∑
i∈K
J¯ i ≤
∑
K⊂N
|K|=N−1
rK
R
J∗sys =
∑
K⊂N
|K|=N−1
N − 1
N
J∗sys.
(45)
7 In Appendix C we provide an example of non-symmetrical users
for which the PCA does not equal the RGN.
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On the other hand we have∑
∀K⊂N
|K|=N−1
∑
i∈K
J¯ i = (N − 1)
∑
i∈N
J¯ i ≥ (N − 1)J∗sys (46)
=
∑
∀K⊂N
|K|=N−1
N − 1
N
J∗sys.
Therefore, by combining (45) with (46) it follows that∑
i∈N J¯
i = J∗sys. However, since J¯ 6= J∗, there exists a user
k for which J¯k < r
k
R J
∗
sys. Thus,∑
i∈N\k
J¯ i = J∗sys − J¯k >
R− rk
R
J∗sys =
rN\k
R
J∗sys,
which is a contradiction to (44). Therefore, there does not
exist any J¯ 6= J∗ for which e∗(J¯) ≺lxm e∗(J∗) and the
Proportional Cost Allocation is equal to the Routing Game
Nucleolus.
Proposition 4.1 establishes that, in contrast to bottleneck
games, not all system-optimal flow profiles are stable. Nev-
ertheless, as a result of Theorem 4.2, we established that
the Proportional Cost Allocation is optimal from a system’s
perspective and is stable for users with additive cost func-
tions. Finally, Theorem 4.3 establishes that, for symmetric
users, the PCA is equal to the nucleolus. Thus, it is highly
recommendable from a network design perspective that
users with additive performance objectives send their flow
according to the proportional flow profile.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We investigated a coalitional routing game from a worst-
case perspective. In particular, we described the cost of each
of the 2N coalitions as corresponding to their maximin flow
profiles. This represents the performance that the coalition
can guarantee itself, even under the pessimistic expectation
that the agents outside the coalition have unpredictable or
even malicious objectives. For bottleneck routing games,
we established that any agreement that is optimal from a
system’s perspective, lies in the core. Such stability is highly
desirable and makes it possible to implement the agreement
(e.g., through a mediator), since no possible coalition of
agents would benefit from deviating from the proposed
solution.
Additionally, we established that the smallest agent in
the system will never prefer the nucleolus over the system-
optimal Proportional Cost Allocation. Furthermore, we de-
scribed an interesting set of scenarios at which a mediator,
e.g., a network administrator, should propose to implement
the system-optimal and min-max fair nucleolus. In particu-
lar, when the two smallest agents in the system are of equal
size, the nucleolus corresponds to a system-optimal flow
profile. On the other hand, in general the Nucleolus is hard
to compute, (see, e.g., [41] and references therein). Thus,
when the conditions of Theorem 3.4 are not satisfied, due
to considerations of complexity, a mediator might be better
off proposing a stable agreement without min-max fairness
guarantees such as the Proportional Cost Allocation.
For agents with additive costs, our study focused on load
balancing (routing) among servers (links). We establish that,
at the maximin flow profile, the malicious users act as if
they were a continuum of infinitesimal (i.e., nonatomic) self-
optimizing agents. Using this result, we established that, in
contrast to bottleneck routing games, stability is generally
not shared by every system-optimal allocation. Neverthe-
less, we showed that the system-optimal Proportional Cost
Allocation lies in the core, and for symmetric agents it is
equal to the nucleolus. Hence, these results suggest that it
would be advantageous for all agents (and the system) if
they send their demand according to the system-optimal
proportional flow profile. Our results establish that such
an agreement is stable, optimal from a system’s perspec-
tive, and for symmetric agents it adds min-max fairness
guarantees. Finally, we established that, when agents in the
network have vastly different performance objectives, even
the PCA does not guarantee stability. This suggests a design
guideline that attempts to separate among homogeneous
groups of users (e.g., highly delay-sensitive, less delay-
sensitive but highly sensitive to packet loss, etc.) so that
each group would agree to share its own network resources
according to the Proportional Cost Allocation.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. In order to prove the theorem we first investigate the
Nash equilibria of a bottleneck routing game. Consider a
user i ∈ N and denote the routing strategies of all users
N\i as f−i. A flow profile f is a Nash equilibrium if for all
i ∈ N ,
J i(f) = min
f˜ i∈Fi
J i(f˜ i, f−i). (47)
In [38] it is proven that such an equilibrium always exists
for bottleneck routing games; in order to investigate its
behavior we first provide the following definition as an
extension of Definition 3.4.
Definition A.1. For any user i ∈ N , a flow profile f is referred to
as balanced in f i, if for any two paths p1, p2 ∈ P with f ip1 > 0,
it holds that maxe∈p1 Te(fe) ≤ maxe∈p2 Te(fe).
For the definition of a balanced flow profile we refer the
reader to Definition 3.4. With the help of Definitions 3.4 and
A.1, we establish the following.
Lemma A.1. Consider a bottleneck routing game. Any Nash
equilibrium is balanced.
Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium f and a user i ∈ N . For
any fixed f−i, from the perspective of i, each link e ∈ E has
an offset of f−ie . As a result, when i sends its flow according
to its best-response strategy f i, it sends its demand as a
single optimizing user in a network with an offset of f−ie
on each link e ∈ E. Thus, according to Lemma 3.2, for any
user i ∈ N , (f i, f−i) is balanced in f i.
We now continue to prove that the Nash equilibrium f
is balanced. Assume by contradiction that f is not balanced.
Thus, there exist paths p, p′ with fp > 0, and
max
e∈p Te(fe) > maxe∈p′
Te(fe). (48)
Therefore, there exists some user j for which f jp > 0. As a
result of (48) and Definition A.1, f , (f j, f−j) is not balanced
in f j, which is a contradiction. Hence, any Nash equilibrium
flow profile f is balanced.
Now consider a coalition S ⊆ N and a bottleneck
routing game with users NS , {S, 1, . . . , NS}. Moreover,
consider a Nash equilibrium f¯ = {f¯S, f¯1, . . . , f¯NS} and a
system-optimal flow profile f∗. According to Lemma A.1,
f¯ is balanced. Thus, every path with positive flow has the
same cost for its worst-case link and
max
e∈E|f¯ie>0
Te(f¯e) = max
e∈E|f¯e>0
Te(f¯e), ∀i ∈ NS
i.e., for any i ∈ NS , J i(f¯) = Jsys(f¯). Moreover, as a result
of Lemma 3.2, it follows that f∗ is balanced. Thus, for any
i ∈ NS ,
max
e∈E|f∗ie >0
Te(f
∗
e ) = max
e∈E|f∗e>0
Te(f
∗
e ), (49)
i.e., for any i ∈ NS , J i(f∗) = Jsys(f∗). Consequently,
J i(f¯) = Jsys(f¯) ≥ Jsys(f∗) = J i(f∗), ∀i ∈ NS , (50)
where the inequality in (50) follows from the definition
of the system optimum. Inequality (50) establishes that at
any Nash equilibrium, all users are worse off than at any
system-optimal profile. Hence, it is immediate that for any
coalition S ⊆ N , any Nash equilibrium f¯ and any system-
optimal flow profile f∗, there exists a user k ∈ S for which,
Jk(f¯) ≥ Jk(f∗). Thus, any system-optimal flow profile f∗
corresponds to a cost vector that lies in the core of the NTU
game as described in Theorem 3.2.
APPENDIX B
An additive routing game where users’ cost functions are not
standard and the PCA does not lie in the core.
Consider a network with two users, two parallel links and
let the users’ demands equal r1 = r2 = 0.5. The costs of the
users are defined as follows:
J1 = f11 f1 + 2f
1
2 (f2 + 1), J
2 =
f21
1 + − f1 +
2f22
2
(f2 + 1),
where 0 <  < 0.1. Note that, the user cost functions are not
standard, since the performance function Te(·) is different
for both users. We first investigate the maximin cost of user
2, i.e., J2(fˆ1, fˆ2). For any given fˆ1, user 2 sends its flow
according to its best-response strategy (6). The minimization
in (6) brings about the following necessary Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) [1], [42] conditions:
if fˆ22 > 0→
2(fˆ12 + fˆ
2
2 + 1) + 2fˆ
2
2
2
≤ 1 + − fˆ
1
1
(1 + − fˆ11 − fˆ21 )2
.
On the other hand,
1 + − fˆ11
(1 + − fˆ11 − fˆ21 )2
≤ 1 + 
2
<
2
2
≤ 2(fˆ
1
2 + fˆ
2
2 + 1) + 2fˆ
2
2
2
.
It follows that for any given fˆ1, user 2 does not flow any-
thing on the second link, i.e., fˆ22 = 0. Thus, fˆ
2
1 = r
2 = 1/2.
Given fˆ21 = 1/2, at the maxmin flow profile it is clear
that user 1 sends all of its demand on the first link, i.e.,
fˆ11 = r
1 = 1/2. Note that, for users without standard cost
functions, the uniqueness of the system-optimal vector of
link flows is not guaranteed [1]. Therefore, there might exist
several proportional profiles, each corresponding to a dif-
ferent system-optimal strategy profile. We need to establish
that there does not exist any system-optimal proportional
flow profile whose corresponding cost vector lies in the core.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a system-optimal
proportional routing strategy f∗ that lies in the core. At the
proportional routing strategy, both users send their flow
according to f il =
f∗l
2 for i = 1, 2 and ∀l ∈ L. Thus, the
costs of user 2 at f∗ equals
J2(f∗) =
1
2f
∗
1
1 + − f∗1
+
f∗2 (f
∗
2 + 1)
2
≤ J2(fˆ1, fˆ2) = 1
2
,
where the inequality is due to the definition of the core. This
turns into
1 ≥ f
∗
1
1 + − f∗1
+
2(1− f∗1 )(2− f∗1 )

. (51)
For any 0 <  < 0.1, (51) only holds if f∗1 = 1. Therefore, if
any system-optimal proportional routing strategy f∗ lies in
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the core, f∗1 = 1 and f
∗
2 = 0. We have that f
1∗
1 = f
2∗
1 =
1
2 ,
and the social cost at f∗ equals,
J∗sys =
∑
i∈{1,2}
J i(f∗) =
1
2
+
1
2
· 1 > 51
2
. (52)
Now consider a different flow profile, f¯ , such that f21 = r
2 =
1/2 and f12 = r
1 = 1/2. The system cost equals
J¯sys =
∑
i∈{1,2}
J i(f¯) =
1/2
1/2 + 
+
3
2
<
5
2
< 5
1
2
, (53)
which is a contradiction to f∗ being optimal.
APPENDIX C
Example of non-symmetrical users for which the PCA does
not equal the RGN.
Consider a network with two users, two parallel links and
let the users’ demands equal r1 = 0.1 and r2 = 0.9. The
costs of the users at f are defined as follows:
J1 =
f11
2− f1 +
f12
1− f2 , J
2 =
f21
2− f1 +
f22
1− f2
At the maximin flow profile of any user, the other user
places all of its demand on the first link. Denote the maximin
profile when user 1 deviates as (fˆ2, fˆ1) and the maximin
profile when user 2 deviates as (f˜1, f˜2). Thus the cost of
users 1 and 2 at (fˆ2, fˆ1) and (f˜1, f˜2) respectively equal:
J1(fˆ2, fˆ1) =
fˆ11
1.1− fˆ11
+
fˆ12
1− fˆ12
J2(f˜1, f˜2) =
f˜21
1.9− f˜21
+
f˜22
1− f˜22
.
By solving the necessary and sufficient KKT conditions [42],
it follows that fˆ11 ≈ 0.076, J1(fˆ2, fˆ1) ≈ 0.099, f˜21 ≈ 0.74,
J2(f˜1, f˜2) ≈ 0.828 and J∗sys ≈ 0.9142. Denote the PCA as
J∗. Thus, e{1}(J∗) ≈ −0.074 and e{2}(J∗) ≈ −0.0062.
Now consider a different optimal flow profile f¯ with cost
vector J¯. At f¯ , we let the users’ flows equal f¯11 = 0.075,
f¯21 = 0.754 and their costs equal J¯
1(f¯) ≈ 0.094, J¯2(f¯) ≈
0.820. It is easy to see that e∗(J¯(f¯)) ≺lxm e∗(J∗). Hence, the
proportional profile is not equal to the RGN.
